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No-Haggle Agreements 
 
Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat* 
 
 	  
Abstract 
 
Some buyers might prefer not to haggle either because they recognize that the 
seller they face is likely to be a superior bargainer or because it is easier to comparison 
shop when prices are known and do not require an investment in transaction costs. 
Sellers, in turn, might appeal to these buyers by promising a no-haggle environment. In 
some settings, sellers can go further by promising individual buyers that they will not 
haggle. These buyers might then engage in one round of haggling, stating a price which 
the seller agrees to accept or reject, with no further possibility of negotiation. Such buyers 
might be more confident of getting better offers from agreeable sellers. We describe why 
and when such a process might be attractive, and suggest a legal remedy that makes it 
possible. This no-haggle process might be attractive to some repeat sellers when dealing 
with occasional buyers, and might often be attractive to one-time sellers and buyers, as in 
the case of many real estate negotiations. 
 
 	  
 I.	  Enforceable	  No-­‐Haggle	  Agreements	  
 
 Some buyers prefer not to haggle, especially when dealing with a professional seller, 
who is apt to be the superior bargainer. In turn, sellers can appeal to these buyers by 
promising a no-haggling environment. New and used car dealers that have chosen this 
strategy are usually entities that have developed national brands, capable of developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Saul Levmore is the William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago 
Law School. Ariel Porat is the Alain Poher Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University, and Fischel-
Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. We thank Lee 
Fennell, Richard McAdams, Martha Nussbaum, and Lior Strahilevitz for helpful comments. 
  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573902 
	  	   2	  
and then capitalizing on reputations for keeping their promises about pricing.1 These no-
haggle sellers must hope that buyers will perceive that the announced, and therefore 
actual, prices are close to the sellers’ costs or reservation prices. It helps that these sellers 
operate in competitive markets with many well-informed buyers. In contrast, a non-repeat 
seller, like most buyers, will find it difficult to convince another party that there will be 
no further bargaining, or that a reservation price has indeed be revealed. We propose a 
device, or legal maneuver, to facilitate such promises.  
 Consider a buyer, B, who wishes to buy an automobile from a seller, S, at a price of 
75 or less. S’s sticker price is 100. B wishes the seller were of the no-haggle kind. Among 
other reasons, accurate (no-haggle) sticker prices reduce B’s transactions costs when 
comparing models or dealers. In the absence of such announced prices, the less the 
expected bargaining, the sooner will B know the actual price required by a given seller. 
In dealing with S, B knows that if he begins the familiar bargaining process at a price of 
70, S might lower her price a bit, and the parties might eventually reach a bargain. But B 
is truly unwilling to pay more than 75 for this model automobile, and fears that S, though 
perhaps willing to sell at 75, will not do so because S will think that B is hoping for a low 
price, but engaging in a dance on the way to a price closer to 100. No matter how much B 
insists that 75 is the most he will pay, there is the likelihood that S will think that B is 
bluffing or unaware of his own future self. Even if B walks away, S may know from 
experience that many buyers do return the next day with higher offers.  
 As an occasional buyer, B is unable to develop a reputation for no-haggle shopping. 
The idea developed here is that B would like to communicate to S that he prefers no-
haggle shopping and, indeed, might only make an offer above 70 if S agrees to a no-
haggle process. S, in turn, must be aware that buyers like B exist. S can choose to 
accommodate B, by offering: “You might like my no-haggle option. If you agree to it 
with respect to a particular automobile, then you state a price, and I will either accept or 
reject that price immediately. If I attempt to bargain, by offering and then selling the 
automobile to you at any price other than the one you declare, I will owe you the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 CarMax sells used cars of recent vintage with such a strategy. Huang, Guofang, Posted Price 
and Haggling in the Used Car Market (January 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805298 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1805298. General Motors’ 
Saturn division did this with its new cars for some time. Thomas J. Cosse & Terry M. 
Weisenberger, Saturn Buyers: Are They Different?, 5 J. Marketing Theory & Practice 77 (1997). 
Many department stores can be understood to follow this pattern, though the inability to bargain 
there might be traced to agency problems. There are regional and national brands that advance the 
no-haggle strategy by specifying when sales will occur. For example, one brand promises that 
marked prices will decrease by 20% after clothes are on the sales floor for one week. After two 
weeks, a 30% discount takes place.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573902 
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difference between your no-haggle offer and our eventual sales price.” In this illustration, 
once B and S agree to proceed with a no-haggle process, and B offers 73, for example, 
then S can sell or not at that price; if S turns the offer down but later transacts with B at 
85, in violation of the no-haggle agreement, S owes 12 to B. This payment can be thought 
of as a fine. Alternatively, the liability of 12 can be understood as quasi-stipulated 
damages or a variety of specific performance; S has agreed to sell at 73 or not at all (to 
B), and these damages bring about that net price. 
 To be sure, S might reason that there will be buyers willing to pay more than 73, but 
also eager to agree to subscribe to the seller’s no-haggle process in the hope that the seller 
will accept the invited take-it-or-leave it offers, though they are lower than the prices the 
seller might have obtained through continued haggling. That risk will cause some sellers 
to write off B, rather than introduce no-haggle agreements. Other sellers might rely on 
their ability to distinguish among customers, and they will be selective in their offers of 
no-haggle agreements. And some sellers might offer no-haggle agreements to all (or 
many) buyers, but then accept some fraction of final offers above a price, such as 73. The 
point of this last strategy is to give buyers, willing to pay more than 73, some reason to 
haggle rather than to accept the process and count on the seller to accept the final offer.  
 II.	  Advantages	  of	  No-­‐Haggling 
   
 An offer not to bargain can provide information, or a useful signal, and more so if 
the signal is reliable. Law can make it more reliable by offering a remedy in the event of 
a false signal. Bargaining normally involves exchanges of information that may or may 
not lead up to a contract. In some settings one party announces a price, not to mention 
other terms, and other parties can accept the price or move on. In other contexts, prices 
are “set” on both sides, with no bargaining authority given to agents, and parties discover 
whether or not they have a deal. But in many situations, including those that concern us 
here, the parties maneuver to get as good a deal as they can. Each side knows its 
reservation price; the buyer knows the highest price he will pay, and the seller knows the 
lowest price she will accept.  
 Imagine, then, the common scenario in which at least one of the parties awaits 
evidence of price flexibility on the part of the other. “Your price of 100 is outrageous. I 
can wait another year before replacing my refrigerator. If you lower the price to 70, I 
will, however, buy it from you now.” We expect, and law tolerates, puffing and huffing 
on both sides, but within limits. If in truth the buyer has no refrigerator at all, and 
completely fabricates the ownership of one that will last another year, or if the buyer has 
actually looked far and wide, and regards the asking price of 100 as a fantastic bargain, 
	  	   4	  
there is no expectation of a legal remedy for the seller – but why not? 2 Law might even 
penalize dishonesty about reservation prices. It could require both parties to write down 
their reservation prices and then declare a sale if the seller’s price is lower than the 
buyer’s, perhaps splitting any overlap, or surplus. If the parties could rely on one 
another’s statements regarding reservation prices, they could save transaction costs and, 
more important perhaps, avoid missing out on mutually beneficial bargains, as they feign, 
lunge, and withdraw in the quest for immediate or long-run bargaining advantage. 
 Unfortunately, perhaps, a transparent system is difficult to imagine much less 
manage. The law would need information about reservation prices, and parties would 
learn to carefully conceal this information, even long after an exchange. When, for 
example, a seller discloses a reservation price of x to a buyer, B1, but is later found to 
have sold the same good to B2 at a price below x, the seller might insist that 
circumstances had changed between the revelation to B1 and sale to B2. If B1 did not 
purchase the good, a successful claim against the seller is even less likely. Ethicists or 
economists might idealize a system in which reservation prices were fully disclosed, and 
repeat players might come close to this civilized system with its transparent reservation 
prices, but in the real world law has no way of knowing one’s inner thoughts, and 
strategic behavior looms large. At best, a seller might try to signal that her price is really 
close to the reservation price, or to the price available to the seller from wholesalers, by 
promising to refund the difference if the buyer finds a lower price at this or any 
competing seller’s establishment within a specified period of time. Contract law would 
then provide the buyer with a remedy if this promise were breached.3 We return to this 
sort of promise below. 
 In practice, no-haggle arrangements appear to have more to do with strategic 
behavior, or perceived inferiority in bargaining skills, than with reservation prices. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Russell Korobkin et al., The Law of Bargaining, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 839, 840 (2004) ("It is 
universally recognized that a negotiator's false statements concerning how valuable an agreement 
is to her or the maximum she is willing to give up or exchange in order to seal an agreement (the 
negotiator's 'reservation point,' or 'bottom line') are not actionable, again on the ground that such 
false statements are common and no reasonable negotiator would rely upon them."); Scott R. 
Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in 
Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 83, 92 (2002) ("it is acceptable for a lawyer to 
misrepresent a client's reservation price"). 
3 Similarly, a buyer might say: “Let me buy this for 70, and if within the month you find another 
buyer who would have paid more than 70, I will owe you the difference.” If the seller produces 
such a buyer, the first buyer will suspect collusion, because the second risks nothing. In turn, 
buyers will be unlikely to make the suggested offer.  
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Department stores, and other vendors known not to bargain, retain control over the timing 
of sales and the availability of advertised items, but consumers who doubt their own 
bargaining skills may well like the idea that the seller is not discriminating among buyers; 
if many other people buy this item at the marked price, then the price can not be too bad. 
Insecure buyers might have reason to believe that a small number of sophisticated 
comparison shoppers are sufficient to keep prices in line.4  
 In a competitive market with homogeneous goods, a buyer’s reservation price is, in 
any event, of little use to sellers. Competition among sellers will reduce price to 
something like marginal cost and, absent collusion, there is no way for a seller to 
capitalize on the fact that some buyers have reservation prices far in excess of marginal 
cost. On the other hand, when transaction costs are substantial, as they might be for the 
purchase of automobiles, or where goods are unique, as in much of the housing market, 
sellers stand to gain when they are superior negotiators and some buyers have high 
reservation prices. In turn, it is in these settings that other sellers might appeal to wary 
buyers by offering no-haggle agreements. Our proposal is aimed at these sellers. They 
might promise an interested buyer, or all buyers, that they will accept or reject the stated 
price immediately, and any future breach, in the form of a sale at a higher price, will be 
re-engineered to the price stated by the buyer after the no-haggle agreement was chosen. 
As above, once B and S agree to proceed with a no-haggle process, and B offers 73, for 
example, then S can sell or not at that price; if S turns the offer down but later transacts 
with B at 85, S owes 12 to B.  
 	  III.	  Disadvantages	  of	  No-­‐Haggling	  Agreements	  
	  A.	  Disadvantages	  to	  the	  Parties	  	  
 It bears emphasis that a seller can decline to offer no-haggle agreements and a buyer 
need not accept one if proffered. Even a buyer who perceives that proceeding under the 
terms of a no-haggle agreement will elicit a lower price from the seller, might prefer to 
retain the power to change his mind. A buyer’s reservation price is often not fixed, but 
rather a function of information obtained through comparisons over time, not to mention 
the buyer’s income. Similarly, the seller might say: “Look, I know that other sellers offer 
you a no-haggle option, such that if you accept that term, you state a price that is then 
accepted or rejected with finality. You might well be offered a lower price in that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Louis L. Wilde & Alan Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 
543 (1979) (showing that when a large enough percentage of consumers compare suppliers, 
suppliers are induced to charge competitive prices). 
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manner, but my experience is that this automobile and my service team is so terrific that 
if you think about the matter, and talk with satisfied customers of mine, you will change 
your mind. Therefore, I will not do anything that precludes you from changing your mind 
and agreeing to a price above 75. I am always ready for you to return to the bargaining 
table.”  
 A seller may choose not to offer our no-haggle procedure because the seller thinks 
the relevant pool of buyers is rich with prospects who have high reservation prices. A 
seller with a cost of 70 might wait for a buyer who will pay 90 because the seller thinks 
that such a buyer is likely to materialize, and that competition among sellers is 
insufficiently robust to drive the price down to 70. 5 
 
 It bears emphasizing that although no-haggle processes can be valuable, and 
creatively designed, there is good reason to think that most parties perceive benefits from 
the freedom to haggle, and would turn down no-haggle agreements of the kind advanced 
here. Reservation prices and bargaining positions can change as new information is 
obtained. It is also the case that a repeat player might find it most profitable to make 
exceptions, either because credibility does not require perfect reliability or because this 
player can detect worthwhile compromises with some parties it encounters. A department 
store with a no-haggling policy might find it worthwhile to suggest price flexibility on 
occasion, as when a buyer learns that a sale is coming, but seems unlikely to return 
during the sale periods. The store policy might require a manager to make this exception 
to the no-haggling norm. Similarly, a store might have a strict, which is to say no-haggle, 
policy regarding returns and refunds, but make exceptions to it. An exception is likely to 
involve some judgment about the particular buyer, the reason for the return, or the store’s 
current inventory. In many cases this information would have been influenced by the 
informed party’s bargaining strategy if haggling (even over price alone) had been 
permitted or expected. 
 B.	  Possible	  Disadvantages	  from	  a	  Social	  Perspective	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It is tempting – but difficult – to generalize about the sorts of buyers and sellers who will agree 
to proceed under the terms of a no-haggle agreement. The agreeable buyer either dislikes the 
haggling process or aims to send a credible message about his highest offer. If the seller thinks 
that her pool of buyers is rich with buyers who simply want to send a credible message in order to 
out-haggle the seller, then the seller need not offer no-haggle terms. But a seller may seek 
information about the buyer’s reservation price, and sense that a no-haggle process is one way to 
gain that information.  
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 Even if a buyer and seller would benefit from an enforceable no-haggle agreement of 
the kind suggested here, the question remains whether these agreements ought to be 
enforced. Put differently, why have no sellers, markets, or legal systems developed or 
even experimented with enforcement and immutability of the kind we require?6 One 
possibility is that law reflects citizens’ understanding that their sober selves will regret 
commitments made in earnest by their agitated earlier selves.7 At the same time, bargains 
are much more valuable if they cannot be undone when one party claims regret. The 
problem is a familiar one, and law responds, first, by looking skeptically at stipulated 
damages that are greater than actual damages and, second, by enabling commitments 
where the cost of limiting escape falls mostly on the party who made the commitment.  
 Law sometimes, but not always, abets commitment strategies. In some jurisdictions 
addicted gamblers can enlist casinos in their battle to control the gambling impulse.8 In a 
sober moment, the potential patron can place himself on a “do not admit” list, and the 
casino is then bound to withhold winnings and to call the police and charge the gambler 
with trespass if it discovers the weak-willed gambler on its premises. It is likely that the 
casino agrees to this plan not because it directly attracts more gamblers, but rather 
because it appeases the regulatory authority, or other political interests, but the overall 
picture is one of empowering the ex ante bargain by denying ex post renegotiation or 
regret. Similarly, law enables prenuptial agreements that might make divorce less likely, 
or proceed on different terms, than the future self might like.9 Law surely allows limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There are, however, limited areas where law encourages or allows only take-it-or-leave-it offers 
or love-it-or-leave-it arrangements. See Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 221 (1995). B’s threat is somewhat like these offers, except that there is a remedy for 
breach that might encourage efficient breach of threats. 
 
7 Such a theory would require that people regret threats made in agitation, or without knowledge 
of their future selves, more often or more dangerously than they make promises they will later 
regret. This seems unlikely. 
 
8  Jim Holt, The New, Soft Paternalism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/magazine/03wwln_lede.html?oref=slogin&_r=0 (stating 
that “[i]n some states with casino gambling . . . compulsive gamblers have the option of putting 
their names on a blacklist . . . that bars them from casinos” and that “[i]f they violate the ban, they 
risk being arrested and having their winnings confiscated”). 
 
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS at §189 (promise in restraint of marriage) (1981). 
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covenants not to compete.10 Some of these examples, or contractual terms, are not 
immutable, and renegotiation is possible, but there is both ex ante commitment and ex 
post no-haggling in these cases. Plainly, law often enables a party to bind, or limit the 
contractual freedom of, the future self. 
 In contrast, law no longer allows eager and weak-willed borrowers to agree to 
debtor’s prison or slavery in the event of default. It enforces stipulated damages, but only 
to a point.11 In these cases, legal enforcement is less likely as the restriction seems less 
efficient ex post. It is not obvious how to fit the proposed immutability of the no-haggle 
agreement in this grouping. The promisor must recognize that new information will bring 
on regret, not to mention ex post inefficiency. The parties do have high transaction-cost 
alternatives, and perhaps that makes it less likely that law will provide ready off-the-rack 
rules for those who think they want help in binding their future selves. We have tried to 
ensure law’s cooperation by framing the no-haggle process, and the remedy for breach, as 
something the seller (in most cases) offers the buyer. The seller need not offer this 
process, and the buyer need not accept it. If, however, the parties voluntarily proceed 
with a no-haggle agreement, courts ought to enforce the fine, or straightforward damage 
provision, suggested here. 
 Of greater theoretical interest is the possibility that law does not yet offer a remedy 
for the breach of a no-haggle promise because it is sensitive to third-party effects. It may 
be that a given buyer, B1, welcomes the seller, S’s, offer of a no-haggle process. B1 sees 
himself as a disadvantaged negotiator and prefers to state a price; if S rejects it, the 
parties are done with one another because S knows that even if B1 returns with a higher 
price, S faces a net sales price equal to the one S recently rejected. The problem is that 
other buyers will find their negotiation positions somewhat weaker. Imagine such a 
buyer, B2, who haggles and then receives an offer from S to proceed under a no-haggle 
agreement. B2 declines the offer and continues to bargain over price. When B2 says: “I’ll 
pay 84 and not a penny more,” B2’s words are a weaker signal than they would be if S 
had not offered, or not been able to offer, a no-haggle agreement with bite. S will reason 
that if this really were B2’s highest offer, then B2 would have agreed to the no-haggle 
process in order to motivate S. The proposed remedy for breach of the no-haggle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ERIC POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 208-11 (2011) (explaining that courts enforce 
reasonable covenants not to compete); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §5.3 (discussing standards that 
courts use to evaluate covenants not to compete). 
 
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS at § §356 (stating that stipulated damages must be 
“reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties 
of proof of loss”). 
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agreement, or simply the proposal that no-haggling be an immutable contractual term, 
serves to sort a group of previously undifferentiated buyers into two groups. It is not 
obvious whether the new equilibrium that will emerge is socially more desirable, 
especially where it is created by law rather than by an enterprising seller.12 Roughly 
speaking, B1 may be better off and B2 worse off because of this change in law. S seems 
better off, having chosen to make the no-haggle offer, though there is also the question of 
whether sellers are now bifurcated, as buyers learn something from a seller’s decision 
whether or not to offer the no-haggling term. 
 	   	  IV.	  	  Existing	  No-­‐Haggle	  Mechanisms	  	  
 The most common no-haggling arrangements are of course those established by 
repeat players. Most department stores, common carriers, and movie theaters are able to 
offer different prices to various subsets of buyers, but it is difficult if not impossible for 
individual buyers to make offers. In contrast, Priceline.com offers consumers the option 
of bidding, or simply making an offer to an array of sellers, for a flight, rental car, or 
hotel room. The bidder enters a price, as well as credit card information, and commits to 
a purchase if any vendor satisfying the stated parameters (such as a car of a certain size, 
or a hotel room with a certain rating and general location) agrees to the price. The 
putative buyer cannot simply begin at a very low price and go up in steps because, 
following a rejected bid, the buyer is locked out from rebidding for the same itinerary for 
24 hours. There is a technical sense in which this is a no-haggle process, but in reality it 
is all haggle, though impersonal; the buyer aims to see how low a price he can obtain, and 
the sellers respond based on their assessments of demand and their own inventories. 
Sellers do not attempt to identify buyers who will promise not to buy the item in question 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 On signal sorting, see ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000) (sorting good 
types and bad types of actors). Imagine, for example, a set of taxpayers who do not like the 
uncertainty of future audits. They would prefer a system in which one could insist on an audit 
upon filing a tax return and then either owe money or receive a guarantee that the tax return was 
accepted and no further money would be owed the government. With such an option in place, the 
government might then know to devote additional resources to auditing those who chose not to 
avail themselves of the new quick-and-certain audit option. In turn, some taxpayers who would 
not have chosen the new option will find it worthwhile to choose it. In the end, it is unclear 
whether the sorting produces a social gain. For an argument in favor of such a scheme, sorting 
taxpayers by their willingness to cooperate with enforcement, see Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing 
Choices: Using taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV 689 (2009).  
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at a higher price. Again, we could imagine such an agreement, but at present there is no 
prospect of enforcement. Indeed, there is no reason to think that the intermediary, 
Priceline.com, shares information about the buyer’s past bidding activity or buying 
inclinations. The bidding buyer is looking for a seller eager to sell at a low price, and the 
bidder does not reveal much about his own reservation price. Sellers have not developed 
a mechanism for distinguishing between strategic and revealing buyers. Only a rare 
bidder would be willing to turn over credit card and GPS information in order to show 
that, once his bid was rejected, he did not travel to the stated location or rent another 
hotel room at a higher price. Absent that information it is difficult for buyers to make 
convincing no-haggle promises. 
 In the business model popularized by Priceline, no-haggling is enforced online by 
the software; the buyer is frozen out of the bidding process for a day, though of course it 
is possible to bid again from a different Internet Service provider address and with 
another family member’s name and credit card. Modest transaction costs serve to keep 
the sellers’ reservation prices hidden, though less so than in most retail transactions, so 
that buyers do not obtain the entire surplus. In other, familiar settings, sellers try to signal 
their reservation prices, or promise not to price discriminate, by guaranteeing that they 
will not be undersold – even by themselves. A buyer who purchases at 85 and then finds 
that this (or another) seller sold to another, or advertised the good, at 73, within a 
specified period, is also entitled to return and collect 12. With respect to some goods, 
sellers can simply promise that goods may be returned for a full refund, so that the buyer 
can begin again, or take advantage of a better price offered by the same or another seller. 
A repeat seller is thus able to make a credible promise about pricing. In contrast, the 
occasional buyer finds it more difficult to do so. Our proposal is designed to allow the 
seller to draw in the occasional buyer to a mutually satisfactory no-haggle agreement. It 
makes little difference whether the buyer reveals his reservation price, or simply is 
strategically attempting to obtain a lower price.  
 A repeat player can develop a reputation for no-haggling, and even for episodic no-
haggling, without any change in law. Imagine, for example, that the seller is a repeat 
player, and the buyer an occasional participant, unlikely to be known to the seller. Such 
sellers have developed means of credibly communicating that their own promises are not 
subject to further bargaining. Thus, a seller might simply develop a reputation for never 
budging from its listed price, and from denying its agents the ability to do so..13  Many 
large retail establishments fit this description, and the no-haggle norm is maintained even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Cf. Douglas G. Baird, Commercial Norms and the Fine Art of the Small Con, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2716, 2724 (2000) (“Unsophisticated consumers are often better off in a market in which no one 
can bargain for special terms than in a market where everyone can.”). 
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as the seller is free to announce “sales,” or periods when prices are reduced to a new, but 
also no-haggle, level. Similarly, a seller might link prices to a specified external, market 
price, so that haggling is out of the question. More interesting, repeat, professional 
sellers, are often constrained by the law of misrepresentation or fraud, and can therefore 
make credible promises in order to attract buyers who do not wish to haggle.14  
 Imagine, for example, a dealer in appliances who says “I offer this refrigerator at 
100, and I know you are hesitating because you expect a holiday sale to produce price 
reductions next week. I want you to feel comfortable buying from me today, so I promise 
you that there is no sale forthcoming, and that I will not budge from this price of 100.” B 
has reason to think that S is truthful because if a sale does materialize, B need only show 
that it was planned, perhaps by pointing to advertising arrangements made by S, in order 
to bring a claim against S for misrepresentation. In anticipation of this, or simply to 
reassure buyers, S will often make a promise of the following kind: “If I do lower prices 
within the next two weeks, I promise that I will refund the difference to you, so that you 
will lose nothing by buying today at 100. If, for example, I offer to others at 90, I will 
simply give you 10.” The promise is enforceable inasmuch as B’s patronage is regarded 
as an acceptance that rounds out a mutual bargain. Alternatively, law might simply say 
that B’s reliance on S’s statement was reasonable. Note that this approach is superior to 
one that tries to make enforceable a promise by S not to lower prices. Most buyers will 
prefer that the seller be free to lower prices later on and, in any event, competition law 
might frown on such a promise.15  
 Sellers do sometimes say “this is a one time offer,” and that sort of a no-haggle 
promise requires a remedy if it is to be believed, as some sellers and buyers surely wish, 
ex ante. Imagine that S makes such an offer, perhaps in the form of “today, only,” of 95. 
If B1 declines to buy, and then discovers the same seller later on offering to sell at a price 
below 95 – B1 will hardly complain. If, however, B2 bought at 95 in stage one, perhaps 
in a rush and with the understanding that S’s offer would not be repeated, then B2 
arguably has a claim because S misrepresented future prices. If B2 can collect, even 
though B1 cannot, S’s original promise is credible to all buyers. But imagine instead that 
S’s breach, if it is that, comes about because S offers at 95 later on, rather than at a 
reduced price. The “today only” promise was broken, but not by a lower price. B2 has no 
conventional remedy, but perhaps S has not haggled. If some buyers are attracted to no-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at §4.9-15 (describing misrepresentation and reliance in contract 
law).  
 
15 See Note, Leegin's Unexplored "Change in Circumstance": The Internet and Resale Price 
Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1600 (2008) (explaining courts’ treatment of resale price 
maintenance). 
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haggle promises because they are pressed for time or because they do not want to be 
disadvantaged in comparison with other buyers, then we might understand S’s promise to 
be something like: “I promise not to haggle over prices today, but tomorrow’s prices 
could be higher or lower than this 95.”  On the other hand, the seller may wish to attract 
buyers who do not wish to be disadvantaged by the seller’s superior knowledge of future 
prices. B2 may value the option of deferring a purchase, and B2 knows that option is 
worth less if S credibly promises that future prices will not be below 95.  
 Whether or not any buyer could obtain damages in the event that S does lower 
prices, there are situations that test the meaning and value of no-haggling. If S says “buy 
now, on Saturday, because I am raising prices on Monday,” and then does not raise 
prices, a Saturday buyer has lost only the option value of waiting. S might have lowered 
prices before Monday or, more plausibly, the buyer might have found another seller with 
lower prices. The buyer was pressured into action by S’s statement and, in turn, if there is 
no remedy for loss of option value, then sellers who really will raise prices in the near 
future have no easy way of credibly encouraging today’s buyers (assuming the seller 
wants the sale today, and assesses it as unlikely that the buyer will return on Monday and 
pay the higher price). Inasmuch as these examples will seem trivial to most readers, 
especially where the seller has a reputational interest and other sellers carry the same 
product, we do not pursue the matter, except to note that if our proposal is accepted, then 
it is necessary to define a no-haggle term. It might be taken to mean: “If you accept this 
term and state a price, I will accept or reject it immediately, and then be liable for 
damages (the difference between an eventual sale price to you and the amount now 
stated) if I reject now but sell to you at a lower price within the next week.” Some sellers 
might instead venture “universal no-haggle agreements” in which the promise extends to 
sales made to any customer within the next week. Of course, the time period can be 
varied as well. 
 V.	  	  Further	  Applications	  	  
 We have seen that where a repeat player anticipates several sales to occasional 
buyers, the seller will find it relatively easy to promise a no-haggle environment, at least 
if no-haggling is narrowly, rather than universally, defined. The remedy developed in this 
Essay is more useful when there is a single or unique item for sale and the parties are 
non-repeat players. In a conventional bargain over real estate, for instance, the seller or 
the buyer might want to signal a reservation price, or at least the fact of a “final offer.” In 
this setting, the occasional buyer may be unable to avoid the negotiation game. The seller 
can avail herself of our method, promising a no-haggle process in which the buyer states 
a price and the seller then accepts or rejects; if the seller rejects and then later sells to this 
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buyer at a higher price, the seller owes the difference. In some settings this process will 
be unattractive to the parties because reservation price is a time-sensitive and 
information-sensitive concept. S may ask 100 and truly be unwilling to accept less than 
99, but B, with a reservation price of 90, may hope that if no higher bids materialize, S 
will reassess the market and eventually lower her price, perhaps even below 90. S might 
want to move B off that 90 position with a no-haggle offer of the kind we have suggested, 
but S can just as well say: “I will sell you the property for 99, and you have one week to 
decide whether to accept this offer.” It is doubtful that S or B would be attracted to a no-
haggle term of longer duration.   
 Return policies do not, of course, involve haggling over price, and the example 
suggests that fairly familiar no-haggling terms might be better understood by way of a 
theory about promises not to bargain quite generally. Inalienability is a still larger 
category, and explanations for that legal limitation on bargaining in some situations seem 
unhelpful in understanding why parties might benefit (or not) from a promise not to 
bargain, or bargain further, over something that is normally subject to negotiation. 
Consider, for example, an employer that promises its employees: “Anyone who asks for a 
raise will be fired, and never hired in the future,” or a suitor who declares: “Marry me 
now under the terms I have just set out, or I will never ask you again.” In the event that 
either of these no-haggle promises is breached, there is no remedy. The employee (or 
object of affection) has no claim if hired (or proposed to), and there is no viable third-
party beneficiary claim by another. In turn, the original no-haggle promise is 
unconvincing, though it might be useful to both parties. It is possible that these parties 
could use third parties to enhance the credibility of their no-haggle promises, but it is 
unlikely that our device would be helpful, or even accepted by courts as immutable. Our 
analysis and proposal regarding no-haggle agreements is best limited to bargaining over a 
price term. 
 Perhaps the most obvious terrain for no-haggling innovations is where parties cannot 
simply walk away and deal with others. Settlement negotiations before and during trials, 
as well as bargaining between the parties to an expiring labor contract, are familiar 
haggling fields. In both settings there are time constraints, and the lack of information 
about reservation prices often leads to brinkmanship. The time constraint can be 
understood as a “natural” no-haggle term. A labor negotiation, for example, might end in 
a flurry of activity as an existing contract comes to an end; earlier offers on both sides are 
not taken seriously. The two sides might slowly work out workplace safety issues and 
various fringe benefits, both because some of these terms are not zero-sum and because 
they are too intricate for fast-moving change at the very end. Among other things, all 
union members want higher wages, but other contractual terms might involve bargaining 
and coalition building among subgroups. Serious offers about the wage term might be left 
for the last moment, when a strike or lockout looms, so that there is a cost to further 
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haggling or posturing. This is not a guarantee that reservation prices are revealed at the 
last moment, but it is suggestive of the benefits of a no-haggle agreement in more 
ordinary contracts. 
 In most cases the parties will benefit if they can avoid the costs of a trial or strike, 
but in many of these cases those costs are insufficiently lumpy to change the game in 
dramatic fashion. Settlement is possible after one day of a trial, and then after another 
day, so that parties might bluff and feint on the eve of each  day. There must be 
situations, and perhaps these comprise the overwhelming majority, where each side 
hesitates to reveal a reservation price or better offer because it fears that this is merely a 
sign of weakness, and that the other side is not yet ready to reveal, or to share the gain 
from avoiding the trial or strike. The obvious question is whether a no-haggle process can 
serve the parties interests. We can imagine such a process in which one party says: “Let’s 
try to settle. In order to encourage you to make your best offer, I suggest that you might 
want to agree to a no-haggle process. If you do agree, then we will toss a coin and 
whoever wins that toss must accept or reject the next offer made by the other party. If this 
final offer is rejected, then we cannot come to an agreement for another 30 days. If we 
settle anyway during that period, then the winner (of the coin toss) must pay so that the 
loser obtains the very result offered and rejected soon after the no-haggle process was 
agreed upon.” If parties can be expected to make very unattractive offers when thrust by 
the coin toss into the unfavorable position of stating a price, then the original offer can 
include a payment for the right to accept or reject, which is to say to go second. 
 If this process works, in the sense that it is found attractive by many parties to 
litigation, or to labor contracts, then it might be unclear whether it succeeds because of 
the lumpiness introduced by the 30-day waiting period or because it offers an alternative 
to haggling. If the waiting period is reduced to a day, haggling will simply continue 
because one can wait a day and then haggle, even after agreeing to a no-haggle process. 
The longer the waiting period – including a term that essentially precludes settling for the 
entire length of the trial – the more likely it is that courts will not support the innovation 
because they will think, perhaps correctly, that it discourages settlements.  	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